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
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (27 Feb 70)

FOR OT-UT-694169

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5 March 1970

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d 7th Aviation
Battalion, [REDACTED] 21 Oct 1969 (6)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

① Operational rep. for quarterly period ending 31 Dec 69
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: (11) 15 Nov 69

② 26p.

Robert E. Lynch
ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 307TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96215

AVBABN-PC

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) SECTION I OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. (C) MISSION: There has been no change in the battalion mission since last reporting period.

b. (C) ORGANIZATION: There has been a change in the battalion organization, since last reporting period. This battalion lost the 199th Avn Co (Util Airplane) and gained the 147th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel) on 1 Sep 69. On 4 Aug 59, the 13th Security Platoon was transferred from HHC, 307th Avn Bn (Cbt) to HHC, 164th Avn Gp (Cbt). There were also some changes for attachments as shown on the Organization and Station Chart, Incl 1.

c. (C) COMMAND GROUP PERSONNEL:

(1) The battalion had nearly a 100% stability rate in the principal staff and command positions.

(2) Composition of the Battalion Command Group:

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>NAME/SSN</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>RELEASED</u>
Commander	LTC	TC	William H. Culton 526 - 34 - 3666	30 Jun 69	N/A
Exec Off	MAJ	TC	Karl A. Brugger 176 - 32 - 3199	27 May 69	N/A
S1	CPT	INF	Jerry L. Black 303 - 38 - 7150	24 Jun 69	N/A
S2	CPT	ADA	James H. Kurilko 207 - 28 - 4000	23 Apr 69	N/A
S3	MAJ	INF	John T. Colson 413 - 48 - 8890	15 Sep 69	N/A
S3	MAJ	SC	William A. Jugel 089 - 26 - 4859	19 Aug 69	12 Sep 69

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<u>POSITION</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>NAME/SSN</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>RELEASED</u>
S3	MAJ	SC	Howard D. Burks 425 - 62 - 5923	15 Mar 69	19 Aug 69
S4	MAJ	ADA	Thomas R. Chapman 313 - 32 - 5015	27 May 69	N/A

(3) Subordinate Unit Commander Changes:

(a) One of the subordinate unit commanders changed during the reporting period,

(b) Composition of subordinate commanders:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>NAME/SSN</u>	<u>COMMANDED FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
WMC 307th	CPT	ADA	James R. Murphy 565 - 56 - 9494	15 Jul 69	N/A
147th Avn Co	MAJ	INF	Marvin E. Cox 257 - 50 - 5515	16 Oct 69	N/A
147th Avn Co	MAJ	TC	*Frank R. Meegan 259 - 50 - 3809	1 Sep 69	15 Oct 69
235th Avn Co	MAJ	LIF	Dewitt T. Monroe 427 - 66 - 7437	6 Jul 69	N/A
244th Avn Co	MAJ	SC	Lilton D. Brooks 484 - 32 - 1456	30 Jul 69	N/A
271st Avn Co	MAJ	INF	William J. Hennigan 036 - 22 - 7769	6 Jul 69	N/A

*Note: 147th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel) was not assigned to this battalion until 1 September 1969.

(c) Subordinate unit executive officer turnovers were as follows: CPT Jerry L. McReynolds, 229 - 52 - 2882 replaced CPT Richard G. Crump, 262 - 78 - 4529 on 1 Sep 69, in the 271st Avn Co; CPT Cleatus W. Shonk, 518 - 35 - 5469 replaced CPT Daniel J. Clark, 527 - 72 - 7132 on 13 Aug 69, in the 235th Avn Co.

d. (C) UNIT STRENGTH AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1969:

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<u>UNIT</u>	OFFICER		NO		EL.		TOTAL	
	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H
147th Avn Co	15	8	26	22	227	206	268	236
235th Avn Co	17	14	39	33	198	192	254	239
244th Avn Co	19	25	22	3	290	289	331	317
271st Avn Co*	15	11	26	24	227	217	258	252
78th FA Det	0	1	1	0	8	8	9	9
774th Med Det	1	1	0	0	7	10	3	11
Cobra Net Team	3	6	12	8	56	66	71	80
HHC 307th Avn Bn	19	15	3	6	86	88	108	109
307th Avn Bn (Cbt)	89	81	129	96	1099	1076	1317	1253

* Note: One officer and five warrant officers are OH-6A aviators who fly for the 164th Avn Gp OH-6A flight platoon

e. (C) CIVILIAN:

<u>UNIT</u>	VN		TECH RLP O/H
	AUTH	O/H	
147th Avn Co	9	12	4
235th Avn Co	12	8	0
244th Avn Co	2	2	2
271st Avn Co	0	2	2
774th Med Det	2	3	0
HHC 307th Avn Bn	6	5	0
307th Avn Bn (Cbt)	31	32	8

f. (U) AWARDS PRESENTED 1 AUGUST TO 31 OCTOBER 1969:

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>147th</u>	<u>235th</u>	<u>244th</u>	<u>271st</u>	<u>HHC</u>	<u>307th Bn</u>
Silver Star		1				1
DFC		3				3
Bronze Star	3	7	6		5	21
ARCOM	9	17	20	5	4	55
Air Medal	31	115	21	30	52	249
Purple Heart				2		2

g. (C) AIRCRAFT STATUS PRESENTED 1 AUGUST TO 31 OCTOBER 1969:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>UH-1</u> <u>AUTH O/H</u>	<u>CH-47</u> <u>AUTH O/H</u>	<u>AH-1G</u> <u>AUTH O/H</u>	<u>OV-1</u> <u>AUTH O/H</u>	<u>U-6</u> <u>AUTH O/H</u>	<u>OH-6</u> <u>AUTH O/H</u>
147th Avn Co	16	16			2	0

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>UH-1</u> <u>AUGUST 0/H</u>	<u>CH-47</u> <u>AUGUST 0/H</u>	<u>AH-1</u> <u>AUGUST 0/H</u>	<u>OH-6</u> <u>AUGUST 0/H</u>	<u>U-6</u> <u>AUGUST 0/H</u>	<u>CH-6</u> <u>AUGUST 0/H</u>
235th Avn Co	2	1	21	20	10	10
244th Avn Co					1	1
271st Avn Co		16	15			2
Cobra Jet Tm			14	13		4*
VIC 307th Bn	0	1				3
307th Avn Bn	2	2	32	31	17	7
					0	0

*OH-6's on hand all belong to the 1st Det, 1st Platoon, 2nd flight platoon.

h. (U) R & R ALLOCATIONS FOR 1 AUGUST TO 31 OCTOBER 1969:

<u>CITY</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
Hawaii	24	20	19
Sydney	18	22	13
Tokyo	2	1	3
Hong Kong	2	1	5
Taipei	1	1	4
Manila	2	1	0
Bangkok	10	1	9
Singapore	4	1	2
Total	73	55	55

i. (C) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND OTHER

(1) VC incidents in the Can Tho area were frequent. Can Tho Air Base - Can Tho City Complex remained under constant surveillance. In the month of August one VC initiated incidents which resulted in one injury. At 1014Z August 1969 a VC placed an explosive device in a vehicle. The vehicle was destroyed. In September, two similar incidents occurred on the 11th and 13th; the VC placed explosives in the rear of a truck and destroyed two vehicles. No injury to individuals occurred in either of these incidents. In the month of October the VC employed a similar tactic. On 10 October 1969, a VC from a position 7 miles east of Can Tho fired 3 rounds at a vehicle. One round received 3 rounds, two explosions killed one individual and injured three others. One dud 75mm recoilless round was found near the scene of the explosion.

Agent reports did reflect an increase in VC activity in Can Tho during the reporting period. Agent reports also stated that the VC planned to initiate three large attacks in Can Tho over month. August and September did contain three major attacks. However, in

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the month of October two days of high-points occurred and continued at a very low rate. The highest day of incidents during the reporting period, took place on the eve of Ho Chi Minh's death, 4 through 5 September. The incidents increased from 18 reported incidents on 3 through 4 September to 35 incidents on 4 through 5 September and on 5 through 6 September the incidents dropped to 29. During the burial of Ho Chi Minh the VC declared a cease fire on 8 through 11 September, however, during that time, the VC violated their own cease fire a total of 32 times, by harassment of the GVN outposts and watch towers.

Infiltration of VC/NVA troops continue to take place throughout the delta, however, the incident rate still remains at a 16 per day average for this reporting period. There were no new units reported as operating in Phong Dinh Province, but agent, PW, and Hoi Chanh reports indicated that the enemy units in Phong Dinh Province were slowly being built up to strength for future missions.

(2) Airfield Security:

During this reporting period several changes were made concerning the airfield perimeter and security. This battalion published OPLAR 5-69, 307th Avn Bn (Cot) which delineated new responsibilities for tenant units of Can Tho Army Airfield and also incorporated the responsibilities of units who provide daytime guards. The daytime guard was formerly administered by the Airfield Security Detachment. Additional bunkers were constructed to strengthen the perimeter and flood lights were installed around the entire airfield complex. The man/dog teams scheduled for assignment to the airfield were approved pending construction of kennels and team offices. The construction plans are currently being studied for a detailed cost analysis with final approval still pending. One item of significance occurred on 20 September 1969 at 0240 hours when 16 sampans and several personnel were spotted near the airfield perimeter. The fire fly flare ship was launched to provide illumination for the A-1G flying night security and 14,000 rounds of minigun ammunition were expended into the target area. A Vietnamese sweep of the area the following morning revealed that all of the sampans had either been destroyed or damaged and several blood trails were found. The immediate response of the airborne night security has proven invaluable in defense of the airfield complex.

(3) Phantom III:

The battalion's offensive operation, Phantom III, continued to

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obtain significant results of which kill ratio of 100% occurs destroyed. However, results have been mixed during the past reporting periods. The strong influence of the漫射器 on the ground in several provinces has reduced the need for the OV-10 to support the AH-1G fire team. Periodically, though, the need arises for continuous action and a high kill ratio is established. An example occurred on 13 October 1969 when Phantom III was eradicated. The following are results for period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969 as follows:

DAYS	KBA STRIKES	KBA CONF/EST	NB CONF/EST	SIGHTED CONF/EST	SHOTS FIRED CONF/EST	SHOTS HIT CONF/EST
87	293	432/4	1/0	316/0/0	347/0/2	235

During the month of September 1969, the 2nd Aviation Battalion developed a new night hunter/killer concept and gave the name "Night Phantom III". The main idea of providing the air assets and control agencies involved in the operation was named Night Phantom III. Night Phantom III consists of (1) OV-10 SLAR aircraft, one (1) UH-1H C & C ship, and two (2) gunships as its air assets. For ground control, the 125th ATC provides AWAC Radar set-up supplied by the 125th ATC. The concept of the operation is as follows: The enemy forces have been known to utilize the rugged terrain in moving supplies through the Tram, an area with the most rugged terrain features in northwest Kien Giang Province, Vietnam. Previous attempts were made by several units to move supplies through the Tram, but the VC from using this area to move supplies from their rear areas to the lower portions of South Vietnam, but all such attempts failed. In conjunction with air assets, supplied by several units, were the AWAC Radar units controlled by the controlling agency, i.e., the 125th ATC. The 125th ATC (Cbt) providing and controlling the AWAC Radar units. The OV-10 SLAR ship flies over the Tram area and provides target information to the AWAC units. The AWAC unit provides target information on the ground to the gunships. The gunships then fly to get a target fix and then take the OV-10 SLAR ship to the target area. The gunships then drop flares and drop them on instructions from the AWAC units. The gunships are equipped with infrared sensors and infrared adjustments.

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visually from the light of the flares. On nights when there are no moving targets spotted, the package is vectored into intelligence target areas that were picked up from either OV-1 photo missions or other intelligence sources. Target coordinates are then relayed from all strikes to an O-1 unit that makes a first light BOA.

Results, at this time, indicate that the Night Phantom III serves as a positive deterrent to enemy movement through the Tram area. Prior to the start of the Tram operation, numerous moving targets were spotted in the area. Once the Night Phantom III began to judiciously search the Tram, a very great number of sightings were initially made, but over a period of nearly two months, the sightings began a steady decrease, which indicated that the operation was stopping most of the movement through the area. The concept worked so well in the Tram where flechette rockets could be employed because of the lack of friendly forces and populated areas that a similar operation was started on 31 October 1969 in the U Minh Forest, where there are virtually no populated areas and, again, where the VC have long had complete freedom of movement. The only difference in the concept of operations between the two areas is the type of target detection aircraft utilized. In the U Minh Forest very few moving targets were located but an OV-1 IR (infra-red) ship was able to locate numerous hot targets.

(4) Safety Statistics 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69: 14,925 hours were flown during the reporting period. There were no aircraft lost to combat damage but there were two fatalities resulting from an aircraft accident.

UNIT	FORCED PRECAUTIONARY		INCIDENTS	ACCIDENTS	ACCIDENT RATE*
	LANDING	LANDING			
147th Avn Co	0	0	0	0	0
235th Avn Co	2	9	1	2	43.7
244th Avn Co	2	7	1	3	105.5
271st Avn Co	0	0	1	0	0
HHC 307th Bn	0	0	0	0	0
307th Avn Bn(Cbt)	4	16	3	5	31.8

*Accident rate based on 100,000 flying hours.

(5) On 1 Sep 69 the 147th Avn Co (halt Spt Heli) located at Vung Tau, RVN was assigned to the 307th Avn Bn (Cbt); concurrently the 199th Avn Co (Utility Airplane) was assigned to the 214th Avn Bn (Cbt) located at Vinh Long, RVN. This change of units produced two significant results:
a) the 199th Avn Co was located with its new battalion headquarters in

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Vinh Long and b) the addition of the 147th Avn Co to the 307th Avn Bn (Cbt) gave control of all CH-47 aircraft op rating in the IV CTZ to one headquarters. The change took place with a minimum of problems with each staff's action coordinating for the exchange of documents and records. The 147th Avn Co was able to continue its mission throughout the change. The 147th "Hillclimbers" were the first non-divisional CH-47 company in RVN and the first CH-47 company to fly 40,000 hours in-country. They are currently flying toward 10,000 accident free hours.

(6) During the reporting period the 205th Avn Co (Attack Hel) furnished the IV Corps Tactical Zone with armed helicopter support. The results from total sorties flown and enemy kill's have indicated a decrease of activity from the last reporting period. The lower totals of this quarter's report versus last quarter's results might be attributed to the pacification program in the IV CTZ and the decreased rate of enemy activity. The company met its commitments of supplying eleven (11) to fourteen (14) aircraft per day for various mission assignments which included, Phantom III, support of VNAF, VIP escort, MEDEVAC cover at night, gun cover for defoliation missions (supporting both Army UH-1's and Air Force C-123's), IV Corps standby, night security of Can Tho Army Airfield, and the new Night Phantom III missions. At one time the unit was down to 16 AH-1G aircraft which required a tremendous maintenance effort to maintain aircraft available for all missions. In spite of this problem, the unit achieved an average of 85% aircraft availability for the reporting period. On 31 Aug 69 the unit moved from its billets and offices on the north side of Can Tho AAf to the south side where the new company area is still under construction. The new area provided aircraft parking adjacent to the maintenance hanger and is very close to the company billets. With the unit drawn together into one area, operational control was increased greatly. A major portion of the move was completed in one day and the unit was able to continue its tactical mission. Results for the reporting period appear on the Operational Statistics Chart, Incl 2.

(7) Side looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) and Infrared (IR) were flown nightly in support of IV CTZ. Intelligence information received from surveillance efforts was disseminated by telephone and teletype to the using agency and inflighted to appropriate sectors via radio from the aircraft. Visual photographic missions were flown daily on a preplanned reconnaissance and immediate priority request basis. In addition to the regularly scheduled missions flown in support of IV CTZ, the 244th Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane) accomplished the following special missions during this reporting period:

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REQUESTING AGENCY	MISSIONS FLOWN	
	INFRARED	PHOTO
7th ARVN Div	19	
9th ARVN	4	
21st ARVN Div	27	
G-2 44th STZ	18	
G-2 Air IV CTZ	75	32
US Navy	6	2
G-2 Air 21st ARVN Div		3
244th Avn Co (S)	51	
G-2 Targeting	12	5
G-3 Targeting		8

During the reporting period this unit suffered the loss of three aircraft. At approximately 2000 hours 7 September 1969, the pilot and observer of an OV-10 experienced an electrical fire in the cockpit and ejected over enemy territory. Both crewmembers were picked up uninjured within hours by a Dustoff aircraft. On 10 September 1969, an OV-10 crashed in Kien Giang Province resulting in the death of both pilot and observer. During the month of October 1969, an OV-10 was involved in a major accident and was evacuated for repairs.

(8) The 271st Avn Co (Aslt Spt Heli) continued to provide the IV CTZ with tactical mobility in support of ARVN troops. The majority of the unit's aircraft were committed to the 21st ARVN Division operating in the South Delta. Because of a decrease in enemy activity, routine missions were run on a regulated and scheduled basis with very few aircraft diverted to tactical emergencies. The unit carried 9,190.7 tons of cargo and 39,800 troops during the reporting period. With a more efficient use of their aircraft, the 271st Avn Co was able to schedule more productive mission tasks than non-productive (flying to a mission area empty) ones and raise their productive mission tasks to nearly 60%. Also, during the reporting period, 177 aircraft recoveries were completed which was an increase of 44 more recoveries than the last quarter. The high point of aircraft recoveries was during the month of October when 66 aircraft were recovered. The 271st is approaching 13,000 accident free flight hours. The 164th Avn Gp OH-6A flight platoon's four OH-6A aircraft are maintained by the 271st. Two LOH's provide dedicated service to IV Corps CORDS (1) and the U.S. Navy (1).

2. (C) SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED, COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMAND ACTION:

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A. (U) PERSONNEL: None.

B. (U) INTELLIGENCE: None

C. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) Air Movement of 155mm Howitzers

(a) OBSERVATION: Battalion requested that CH-47's no longer be required to move 155mm Howitzers.

(b) EVALUATION: Weight of the 155mm Howitzer is 12,950 pounds and will on most occasions in RVN exceed the lift capability of the CH-47B. In the past, with newer aircraft, several CH-47B's were able to lift 155's. However, with the resultant strain placed on the aircraft and the average time on the aircraft of 1350 hours, the older aircraft are not able to lift the 155's and stay within the established limits.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That CH-47B aircraft not be committed to airlift 155mm Howitzers.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A letter was forwarded through channels on 14 Oct 69 setting in detail the facts and reasoning involved in making this recommendation.

(2) Tactical Ground Radar Use

(a) OBSERVATION: The tactical ground control radar working in conjunction with the OV-10 (SLAR) side looking airborne radar and the OV-10 (IR) infrared, with an immediate strike aircraft capability on stand-by alert, is effective for vectoring aircraft for night hunter/killer operations.

(b) EVALUATION: A new concept of interdicting enemy infiltration is currently being evaluated by the battalion. A suspected area of high activity is chosen and missions are pre-planned for that area. Moving target detection is accomplished by maintaining continuous surveillance over the area with an OV-10 (SLAR) aircraft flying a racetrack pattern at an optimum altitude of 7,000 feet AGL. Heat emitting targets are discovered by the OV-10 (IR) flying pre-planned canals and roads at 1,500 feet AGL. When a possible target is detected by the aircraft it is plotted and relayed to the tactical operations center. If ground data terminal stations are used, the targets are plotted at the station and passed to the operations center. The operations center evaluates the target

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information and relays this to the strike aircraft. The strike aircraft being used is the Army AH-1G "Cobra". The strike aircraft then contacts the tactical ground control radar and is vectored to the target area. The advantages of utilizing ground control radar are:

1. The guidance of strike aircraft directly to the target.
2. Aircraft separation within the target area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the possible use of ground control radar with a strike force capability be disseminated to all concerned aircraft units.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This concept is still under evaluation. However, initial results indicate that operations of this nature are very effective in deterring infiltration.

D. (U) ORGANIZATION: None.

E. (U) TRAINING: None.

F. (C) LOGISTICS:

CH-47 Sling Loads

(a) OBSERVATION: Units supported by this battalion for air movement and sling loads utilizing CH-47 aircraft are using unserviceable rigging gear and improper rigging techniques.

(b) EVALUATION: During this reporting period, twelve (12) sling loads were dropped or partially damaged because of improper rigging procedures and/or unservicable rigging gear. Seven (7) loads dropped were lost or destroyed because the rigging broke. Four (4) loads came apart in the air because of improper rigging and were either partially or completely destroyed. One load was dropped because of a malfunctioning hook. Also, insufficient amounts of servicable rigging gear have caused undue delays on multiple-sortie missions because of the need to use the same set of slings and rigging equipment on each sortie.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That since the majority of missions are in support of ARVN troops, this information be passed through the Vietnamese logistical channels for action. And, that consideration be given to supplying U.S. units with an appropriate amount of rigging equipment.

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AVBAEN-PC

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for Period ending 31 October 1969, RCG, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Dropped load reports are submitted as they occur and are forwarded through channels to the 1st Aviation Brigade.

G. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: None.

H. (C) MATERIAL:

(1) Resistor Modification.

(a) OBSERVATION: After 150 hours of operation in the CH-47 the different channels in the flight controls (pitch, yaw, and roll) began to pick up inputs from the Stability Augmentation System (SAS).

(b) EVALUATION: Avionics personnel qualified in SAS evaluated the problem and found that the resultant inputs in the faulty system were due to erroneous signals sent by the SAS variable resistor, P/N 5905-856-6684, removing the variable resistor from the link, they discovered that by just sliding the plunger back and forth a notch could be felt. Upon removing the plastic side plates from the resistor a large notch could be seen in the rails on one side plate. The opposite side plate was not damaged.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To stop the loss of many dollars, it is recommended that the side plate with the large rails on it be placed into the supply system as a separate item. The cost should be only a fraction of the \$30.76 for the entire resistor. This recommendation is an immediate solution. To stop wear on the tracks resulting in the groove, it is recommended that the following areas be evaluated: Heat factor, the possibility of constructing the tracks out of stainless steel, the possibility of making a wiper arm that is more compatible to the tracks, or going to a completely new type resistor.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The only means at this time to correct the problem is to replace the entire resistor. As a means to slow down the wear on the resistor, require the SAS to be disengaged during ground taxi. As a long range corrective action, two EIR's have been submitted. (EIR numbers: V30846 and C96604)

I. (C) OTHER:

AH-1G Revetments.

(a) OBSERVATION: Revetments previously built at Can Tho AAF for AH-1Gs are unsafe during the "dry" season when the aircraft are positioned correctly.

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15 November 1969

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(b) EVALUATION: The "L" shaped revetments are constructed so the AH-1Gs, when correctly positioned, are facing west. The AH-1G (Cobra) is critical hovering downwind or hovering facing downwind with a left quartering tail wind. During the "dry" season the prevailing wind is southeast, causing an almost constant critical condition when the "Cobras" are hovered into and out of the revetments. An alternative to hovering in and out is landing to the ramp and ground handling the aircraft into and out of the revetments; this is impractical as a solution for the following reasons:

1. Most "Cobras" on the line are fully loaded with fuel and rockets. Ground handling wheels are constructed to handle empty aircraft only and will not stand up under loaded ships.

2. A part of the unit's mission is a 5 minute standby (5 minutes from alert to airborne) and it would be impossible to use the revetments with the ground handling method and meet this requirement.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that future AH-1G revetments be constructed under the below mentioned new style to facilitate hovering into and out of the confined revetment areas.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A work order was submitted on 29 Oct 69 to alter the present "L" shaped revetments to extend the long side allowing parking in two directions. Until modifications are complete, the pilots are instructed to park on the ramp and ground handle the aircraft when the wind is from the east.

2 Incl
as

WILLIAM H. CULTON
LTC, TC
Commanding

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AVERAGE (15 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, 164TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT), APO 96215, 28 November 1969

TU: Department of the Army, ATTN: ACFOR
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBAGC-U, APO 96304

1. (U) The attached 307th CAB UML for the period ending 31 October 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. (U) The following addressees should be inserted between the subject and paragraph 1:

CINCU3AMPAC, ATTN: GPOF-DT

Commanding General, USAV, ATTN: AVHGC (DST)

Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVGA-G

Commanding Officer, 164th Aviation Group (Combat)

3. (C) The following comments are made on the report:

a. (C) Para 2 c (1) (b), page 10: The movement of the 155mm howitzer by CH-47B obviously presents special problems even under good conditions. Additional problems of environment in the IV CTZ and the age of the CH-47 aircraft increase the critical aspects of this operation. During the dry season, the IV CTZ will have a higher density altitude, which reduces the lift capability of any aircraft. Examination of the CH-47 operators manual reveals that the movement of a 155mm howitzer during some of the weather conditions which may be expected during the dry season will be impossible. In the interests of mission accomplishment in the safest manner, the mission of air movement of 155mm howitzers requires careful and detailed planning. While on occasion it will be impossible for the CH-47 to lift a howitzer, detailed planning of each requested mission will insure that the maximum possible number of requested missions are safely accomplished. The weight of the load, weather conditions, required fuel load, and aircraft and crew capabilities are the major factors affecting the mission. Some weight (approximately 500 pounds) may be reduced from the howitzer by removing the spades and other equipment. This weight although small, may make the difference in the ability of the CH-47 to lift the howitzer. The gross weight of the aircraft may be reduced by refueling the aircraft with only the fuel required to complete the mission plus the required reserve. Reduction of the fuel load will significantly reduce the range of the aircraft, and these two factors must be carefully considered during the planning for the mission.

b. (C) Para 2 c (1) (c), page 10: This headquarters concurs that the CH-47B aircraft should not be committed to airlift 155mm howitzers within RVN. Further recommend that higher headquarters, restrict the transport

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AVBAC 3 (15 Nov 69) 1st and 2d November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, AVBAC-65 (n2), (U)
of 155mm howitzers by CH-47B helicopters.

c. (C) Para 2 c (1) (d) page 10: on 17 October 1969, this headquarters recommended to Delta Military Advisory Command that CH-47B should not be used to transport 155mm howitzers. A draft message was prepared to be sent by DMAC to Division/Special Tactical Zone Senior Advisors stating that 155mm howitzers would not be transported by CH-47 aircraft. DMAC did not approve this recommendation. This headquarters recommended that DMAC directives and SOPS reflect that 155mm howitzers will not be carried by CH-47 aircraft except as a special mission or in an emergency situation due to the excessive weight of the howitzer.

d. (C) Para 2 c (2) (c), page 11: Concur. Through coordination with the 165th Aviation Group, this headquarters has established TRN 18 radar sites at three locations within the IV CTZ, the Cement Plant (V. 596356), Ca Mau, and Moc Hoa. The Cement Plant and Ca Mau radars are used in conjunction with operation Night Phantom III and the Moc Hoa radar is used with the Night Hunter Killer operation, a night interdiction border surveillance and reactionary mission with an organization of one UH-1 with flare racks installed, one UH-1 command and control aircraft and two armed helicopters (UH-1 or AH-1G). Troop transports for reaction are normally on standby at Vinh Long. This headquarters is presently planning to install another TRN 18 at Chau Doc to insure complete coverage of the Vietnamese-Cambodian border. Experience has proved that the TRN 18 has a range of approximately 30 statute miles. This headquarters recommends that a radar with a greater range (80 statute miles) and the same degree of accuracy be employed by using the same concept. This would result in a reduction in the number of radar sites and an increase in the area of coverage (see Incl 1).

e. (C) Para 2 f (c), page 11: Concur. The 164th Aviation Group (Combat) S-4 has also had difficulty in obtaining adequate rigging equipment to support its operational requirements. On 23 November 1969, this headquarters indorsed a 307th CAB letter to G-4, DMAC, explaining the unserviceable condition of supported unit's rigging equipment.

f. (U) Para 2 h (1), (c), page 12: Concur with basic recommendation however, the damper shaft labeled "A" in attached II. 55-1520-229-20-2 extract (Incl 2), should also be strengthened. This shaft also fails frequently necessitating removal of the complete subassembly. To replace the rail without strengthening the damper shaft would not completely solve this problem.

g. (C) Para 2 I (c), page 13: Concur.

h. (C) Para 2 I (a), page 13: Request for an exception to policy upgrading revetment configuration has been forwarded by indorsement,

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AVBulet (15 Nov 69) 1st Ind 26 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat), for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RUC CorUx-65 (x2) (U)

recommending approval, to 1st Aviation Brigade.

i. (U) Incl 1: 69th Inf. Det. should read Th 3, 69th Inf. Det.

J. M. TUNIS

J. M. TUNIS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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AVEAGC-O (15 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, CL, C-FOR-65
(.2) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96304

6 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVEAGC-OAT
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-OP,
APO 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with
the contents as indorsed.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2c(1), page 10, discusses limitations of CH-47B aircraft airlifting 155mm howitzers. This headquarters recognizes limitations posed by older aircraft and associated systems. Airframe hours, dynamic component wear, frequency of operating at or near maximum gross weight configurations and area of operation contribute substantially to aircraft efficiency. Most aircraft in the Republic of Vietnam operate at the extreme limits of their capability during the majority of missions in this environment, and as a result, lose a percentage of their operational efficiency. In transporting 155mm howitzers, CH-47B aircraft operate at or near maximum gross weight; therefore, any loss of aircraft efficiency would limit the ability to transport loads of this weight. In meeting a similar situation, one of the units in USAF adopted the following procedure, which is also recommended by this headquarters:

- (1) Require 12 to 24 hour notification.
- (2) Plan lift prior to 0900 hours.
- (3) Maximum temperature 26° C or 79° F.
- (4) 155mm Howitzer stripped to minimum weight, 12,300 lbs.
- (5) CH-47B fuel load adjusted to 2,000 lbs or less.

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DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVBAGC-0

8 NOV 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS, CSFOR-65
(R2) (U)

(6) If necessary, reduce weight of aircraft by removing seats, tool boxes, footlockers, chains, straps, oil, etc.

(7) Derive maximum gross weight for hovering out of ground effect from -10 chart.

(8) Reduce figure derived from -10 chart by 8% (6% for rebuilt engines plus 2% USARV required safety reserve).

(9) Above procedure for use sea level to sea level, short haul or sea level to 1600 ft MSL only.

(10) Direct coordination must be effected between supported units to insure compliance in all cases.

b. Paragraph 2c(2), page 10, discusses the use of tactical ground control radar to assist in night interdiction of enemy movement. Concur. The concept of utilizing tactical ground control radar to vector AH-1G aircraft to targets detected by OV-1B Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), and OV-1C Infrared (IR) aircraft is a sound procedure. Effectiveness is evidenced by the success of the 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) in reducing enemy movement at night. The information on this technique has been disseminated to subordinate units of this command.

c. Paragraph 2i(a), page 12, discusses the adequacy of AH-1G revetments at Can Tho AAF. This headquarters concurs with the evaluation, but nonconcurs with the recommendation. The AH-1G revetments at Can Tho were constructed as "L" shaped revetments at the request of the using unit. An exception to USARV gunship revetment criteria was obtained to allow the non-standard construction. Current USARV gunship revetment criteria provides for unrestricted hovering exit and entry by mission ready armed helicopters and permits parking in either of two directions to take advantage of the most favorable wind condition. These revetments also barricade the inadvertent firing of armed helicopter weapon systems. The gunship revetment entrance sides alternate in the revetment row to reduce multiple aircraft damage by mortar or rocket rounds bursting in hoverlanes. As an alternative, all revetment entrances may be on the same side in the revetment row when available real estate does not permit hoverlanes on both sides of the row. The work order submitted by the unit to reconfigure the revetments to USARV

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
AVBAGC-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS, CSFOR-65
(R2) (U)

8 Nov 1969

Criteria has been approved by this headquarters as a self-help project and forwarded to USARV for approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT '66
A.

Copy 2d Ind Furn:
CO, 307th Avn Bn (Cbt)

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AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 307th Aviation Battalion
(Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)
(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

29 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Air Movement of 155mm Howitzers", page 10, paragraph 2C(1); 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3a, 3b, and 3c; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a; concur with 2d Indorsement. Whenever possible CH-47C(-) or CH-47C helicopters should be used to lift sling loads exceeding 8,000 pounds.

b. Reference item concerning "CH-47 Sling Loads", page 11, paragraph 2F, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3e; concur. Instructions for the rigging of external loads for air lift by helicopter are contained in TM 55-450-11, Air Transport of Supplies and Equipment: Helicopter External Loads Rigged with Air Delivery Equipment, and TM 55-450-12, Air Transport of Supplies and Equipment: External Loads for Sling, Nylon and Chain, Multiple Leg. Consideration is now being given to translating these manuals into Vietnamese for distribution to ARVN forces.

c. Reference item concerning "AH-1G Revetments", page 12, paragraph 2I, and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c; concur with 2d Indorsement. No action by higher headquarters is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



L. D. MURRAY

CPT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
307th CAB
1st AVN BDE

GPOP-DT (15 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 307th Aviation Battalion (Combat)
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOM-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 FEB 1970


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

ORGANIZATION CHART - 307TH AVN BN (CBT)
31 OCTOBER 1969



Incl 1

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Incl 2

307TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
Operational Statistics
1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969

Incl 2

UNIT	SORTIES	TRANSPORT		ACFT RECO- VERTY	HOURS FLOWN	KGS	STRUCTURES		SAMPAKS		COMBAT	
		TONS	PAK				DEST	DAM	DEST	DAM	GITS	DEST
147th Avn Co	6911	6107.7	31,302	57	3152	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
235th Avn Co	5101	0	0	0	4724	721	3C22	2C05	1130	197	44	0
244th Avn Co	859	0	0	0	2501	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
271st Avn Co*	9119	9190.7	39,808	177	4468	0	0	0	0	0	12	0
307th Avn Bn	23,323	5290.4	71,110	234	14,925	721	3C22	2C05	1130	197	61	0

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*Note: Statistics include data from 164th Gp C1A-G flight platoon

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

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5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, 307th Aviation Battalion

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